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REcENT CASES
The court, however, can hardly be blamed for not repudiating this
well-settled rule, especially in a case in which the application of the
rule results in no injustice.' 9 In ordering the case to proceed to trial
on the merits, the court reached a decision amply grounded on both
authority and logic.
Tom SoYABs
STATUTE OF FnAuDs-PEsoNAL SERNwcEs AS PART PERFORMANCE OF
ORAL CoNTRAcr To DEvisE-Plaintiff brought action against decedents
executor to set aside decedent's will, claiming that decedent had orally
contracted to will his property, real and personal, to plaintiff. By the
terms of the contract, plaintiff was to receive the property in return
for services which she performed in caring for decedent before death.
The plaintiff contended that the provision of the Statute of Frauds,
requiring land contracts to be in writing was not applicable. The
plaintiff further contended in the alternative that her situation was
unique since she had already performed the services and since she
had left her home and gone to live with the decedent in order to per-
form the agreement. Therefore, the contract was without the Statute
of Frauds even though the statute might apply generally to contracts
relating to land. The plaintiff further contended that the contract was
severable; therefore the statute would not apply to that portion of the
contract concerning personalty. In other words, plaintiff sought to
recover either on the theory that the Statute of Frauds did not apply
or that the doctrine of part performance governed the validity of this
particular contract. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the peti-
tion, and the plaintiff appealed. Held: Affirmed. Bitzer v. Moock's
Executor and Trustee, 271 S.W. 2d 877 (Ky. 1954). The court ex-
plained that contracts to devise property are generally regarded as
entire, and are not severable, despite the fact that the contract includes
both realty and personalty, and an oral contract to devise property
which includes real estate is barred by the Statute of Frauds. Further,
personal services as part performance of a contract to convey or devise
will not remove it from the statute, since the party performing has
grounds for an action at law in quantum meruit to recover the reason-
able value of the services peformed.
Although it might appear that the contract in the principal case
'If the Kentucky Court of Appeals should ever decide to reverse itself on
this point, without actually repudiating its earlier decisions, (see footnote 11) it
might possibly base its change of position on the "spirt of the New Rules" which
the court should treat as authorizing a further liberalization of procedure.
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should have been classified as one to make'a will rather than a contract
to transfer land, the Kentucky court has uniformly held that a contract
to make a will which includes a devise of realty is within the Statute
of Frauds.' This is in accord with the weight of authority.
2
Under the majority rule, performance of the services is not regarded
as sufficient part performance to take the contract out of the statute
and sustain a decree of specific enforcement. One basis for this view
is that the value of the services can be accurately estimated and the
performer has an adequate remedy at law in quantum meruit.3 A
primary objection to specific enforcement is that the relief sought
would result in denying the deceased the power to dispose of his
property as he wishes.4 The leading Kentucky case of Walker v. Dills
Adm'r.5 follows the majority view. As the court there pointed out:
In cases of this kind we have frequently held that an action
could not be maintained for specific performance because the con-
tract is within the statute of frauds prohibiting the sale or transfer
of land by parol, and, further, that a part performance of the con-
tract, such as the performance of the service, the delivery of con-
sideration, will not take the contract out of the statute of frauds.6
Many states which follow the rule that mere payment of considera-
tion in the form of performing personal services is not sufficient part
performance hold however that if the part performance results in a
change in the promisee's course of life so that adequate compensation
cannot be secured at law, the contract is specifically enforceable.
Such a change occurs where the promisee changes his course of life
and performs services. 7 Evidence of such a change not only supports
the existence of the contract, but tends to show that the remedy at law
is inadequate, because the change of position ordinarily would not be
taken into account in fixing the damages recoverable in quantum
meruit. The measure of damages at law is the value of the services
to the promisor, and not the detriment to the promisee. Where part
performance is of such nature that a court of law cannot restore the
promisee to his original position, then equity has the power to take
'Walker v. Dill's Adm'r., 186 Ky. 688, 218 S.W. 247 (1920).
249 AM. Jun. 490 (1943).
'Goodloe v. Goodloe, 116 Tenn. 252, 92 S.W. 767 (1906).
'Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E. 2d 889 (1945).
'Supra note 1. 6 Id., at 643, 218 S.W. at 249.
'Williams v. Williams, 128 Ark. 1, 193 S.W. 82 (1917) (Promisee gave up
lucrative employment to perform services); Wolf v. Donahue, 206 Cal. 213, 273
Pac. 547 (1929) (Promisee moved from Connecticut to California in reliance on
the promise); Chambers v. Appel, 392 Ill. 294, 64 N.E. 2d 511 (1946) (Promisee
discontinued teaching to perform services for the promisor); Seitz v. Sitze, 215
Minn. 452, 10 N.W. 2d 426 (1943) (Plaintiff relied on an oral contract and
performed duties imposed by it.).
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the contract out of the Statute of Frauds to avoid working a fraud
on the promisee."
Under this minority view, proof of the contract must be clear and
convincing and the acts of service must have been performed pursuant
to the contract.9 If the promisee is to have specific performance, he
must prove that he has fully performed his part of the agreement,
and could not be restored to his prior status; also that there was such
an agreement, and that the terms were as he claims them to be.10 If
this burden of proof is met, then a minority of states grant equitable
relief to prevent a hardship on the promisee, regardless of whether he
has taken possession of the realty specified as the consideration for
the contract or not.' This is merely an application of the general
equitable doctrine that specific performance of a contract will be en-
forced where there is no adequate compensation at law, and where
fraud and injustice would result from non-enforcement.'
2
The Kentucky view however, refuses to recognize personal services
as sufficient part performance to take a land contract out of the statute
of frauds. The Walker case 13 already mentioned is typical. There the
plaintiff cared for a Mr. Dill and lodged and fed him during his late
years, in reliance on his promise that certain property would be hers
at his death. Dill stated to several witnesses that he intended to leave
his house and lot to Mrs. Walker, and there was sufficient proof of the
contract. The Court, in refusing specific performance, stated:
. . . in cases in which it is possible to determine from the evidence
the reasonable value of the services performed, this will be the
measure of recovery, but where the thing done or services per-
formed are of such nature as not to admit of a reduction to a
monetary value, then the contract made between the parties will be
received to fix the value; and in case where lands or other property
is agreed to be devised, the value of such property or land will be
considered as the measure of recovery, though the thing itself can-
not be recovered nor the contract specifically enforced.14
It is submitted that compensation in money, even if measured by
the value of the property and not by quantum meruit, is an insufficient
remedy in cases of this type. Often it is the promise of the property
itself which persuades one to make a contract to care for others, and
the offer of money alone would not induce the making of the contract.
Therefore giving money as damages would not adequately repay the
'Best v. Grolapp, 69 Neb. 811, 96 N.W. 641 (1903).
'Houlette v. Johnson, 205 Iowa 687, 216 N.W. 679 (1927).
"Alban v. Schneiders, 67 Ohio App. 397, 34 N.E. 2d 302 (1940).
1 Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 Pae. 218 (1893).
"Bryson v. McShane, 48 W. Va. 126, 35 S.E. 848 (1900).
" Supra note 1. " Id. at 643, 218 S.W. at 249.
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person who has performed the services. Even if the compensation
were measured by quantum meruit, the problem would still arise as
to the value of the service to the promisor. As one court so aptly ex-
pressed it:
There are things which money cannot buy; a thousand
nameless and delicate services and attentions, incapable of being the
subject of explicit contract, which money, with all its peculiar
potency, is powerless to purchase.
The law furnishes no standard whereby the value of such
services can be estimated, and equity can only make an approxima-
tion in that direction by decreeing the specific execution of the con-
tract.15
It is believed that the minority view granting specific performance
reaches a more equitable result because the promisee receives what
he bargained for and avoids the problem of measuring the value of
intimate companionship and personal attention.
ROBERT A. PALuMIER
TAxA~ioN-ExcIsEs-Is "GREENS FE" FoR MiNATuRE GoiF T~xAmB
As Am.nssioN? Plaintiff operated a miniature golf course located
within a fenced area. A person desiring to play golf had to pay a fee
of forty cents, which entitled him to the use of a golf ball, a putter,
and the course. Persons who did not desire to play were permitted
to circulate through the course without restriction, and without fee
or charge. Plaintiff contended that these fees for the privilege of
playing on the miniature golf course did not constitute "admissions to
places of amusement or entertainment" under Kentucky Revised
Statutes section 138.020 and therefore were not subject to the state
excise tax on the sale of such admissions. In a declaratory judgment
action brought by the proprietor of the miniature golf course, the
circuit court held that such fees were taxable. On appeal, judgment
was reversed by a divided court, five to two. Spotlight Miniature Golf,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 279 S.W. 2d 795 (Ky. 1955).'
The portions of the excise tax statute involved here are Kentucky
Revised Statutes sections 138.010(2) and 138.020(1) (1953). Section
138.020(1) imposes an excise tax upon "the sale of admissions to
places of amusement or entertainment", subject to certain exemptions
not important here. Section 138.010(2) defines places of amusement
or entertainment as including:
"Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 101, 114 (1876).
' Rehearing denied. June 24, 1955.
